Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, pages 91-95

Abstract: This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203-229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

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