Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests

Christian At and Morand, Pierre-Henri

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, pages 458-460

Abstract: This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.

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