The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market

Fuhito Kojima

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, pages 581-584

Abstract: In the college admission problem, we show that the student-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for students if colleges' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand. We also show that both of these properties are important for the result.

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