Temporary contracts, employment protection and skill: A simple model

Elena Casquel and Antoni Cunyat ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 3, pages 333-336

Abstract: We construct a theoretical labor market that incorporates skill differences across workers to identify under which conditions temporary contracts are a way to access to permanency. Firing costs and unemployment benefits increase the threshold productivity above which workers access to permanency.

Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:3:p:333-336

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