Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

Hajime Kobayashi and Katsunori Ohta

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 1, pages 4-5

Abstract: This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.

Keywords: C72; C73; L13; Multimarket; contact; Continuous-time; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:1:p:4-5

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