Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Carlos Alós-Ferrer ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 2, pages 134-136

Abstract: This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.

Keywords: Imitation; Inertia; Learning; Memory; Mutations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84 ... 668d89a2f2c2f39f782b
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:134-136

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Wendy Shamier ().