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Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
Carlos Alós-Ferrer , 2008, vol. 101, issue 2, pages 134-136
Economics Letters Abstract:
This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.
Keywords: Imitation; Inertia; Learning; Memory; Mutations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:134-136
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