A restriction on lobbyist donations

Brendan Kline

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 3, pages 129-132

Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of a fine for violating a ceiling on permissible donations in a competition for a political prize. Increasing the fine can increase or decrease the amount of expected donations in equilibrium.

Keywords: Lobbying; All-pay; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84 ... 074e6a2be4170c54bdcc
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:129-132

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is edited by E. Maskin

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().