Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

Harvey E. Lapan and GianCarlo Moschini

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 3, pages 144-147

Abstract: A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).

Keywords: Comparative; statics; Log-concavity; Minimum; quality; standards; Quality; certification; Vertical; product; differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Working Paper: Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:144-147

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