Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions

Sylvain Bourjade ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 23-27

Abstract: I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear.

Keywords: Uniform; price; auctions; Rationing; Uncertainty; Initial; public; offerings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price Auctions (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:23-27

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