Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second-price auction

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Joule, Robert-Vincent, Stéphane Luchini and Jason Shogren ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 36-38

Abstract: This paper considers whether earned wealth affects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Keywords: Auctions; Demand; revelation; Experimental; valuation; Hypothetical; bias; Earned; money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2008)
Working Paper: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:36-38

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