Managerial overload and organization design

Yossi Spiegel

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 53-55

Abstract: This paper considers a firm's choice between a "divisional structure" and a "functional structure." It shows that an increase in the number of projects which the firm can adopt creates a managerial overload, which favors the divisional structure.

Keywords: Divisional; structure; Functional; structure; Project; selection; Moral; hazard; Moral; hazard; in; teams; Managerial; overload (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:53-55

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