The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Helmuts Azacis () and David Collie

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 56-57

Abstract: The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). [`]The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp. 116-121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

Keywords: Optimal; punishments; Trigger; strategies; Collusion; Cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Working Paper: The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames (2007)
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