An exercise in political economy of tax reform

Haldun Evrenk ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 81-82

Abstract: If the tax rate is endogenously determined by majority voting, then a fully effective and costless reform resulting in full tax compliance may not be supported by a majority even when the evaders (or, avoiders) are only a minority.

Keywords: Political; support; Tax; reform; Majority; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:81-82

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