EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations
Timo Henckel ,
Gordon Menzies Nick Prokhovnik and
Daniel John Zizzo , 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, pages 144-147
Economics Letters Abstract:
We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (Barro and Gordon, 1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.
Keywords: Credibility; Time; inconsistency; Reputation; Inferential; expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511001248
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works: Working Paper: Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations (2010) Working Paper: Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations (2010) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:144-147
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is edited by
Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Wendy Shamier ().