Do hard pegs avoid currency crises? An evaluation using matching estimators

Taro Esaka

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, pages 35-38

Abstract: Using the bias-corrected matching estimators of Abadie and Imbens (2006) as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we estimate the average treatment effect of hard pegs on the occurrence of currency crises. We find the evidence that hard pegs significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes.

Keywords: Exchange; rate; regimes; Hard; pegs; Currency; crises; Self-selection; bias; Matching; estimators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:35-38

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