Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

Jonathan G. James and Phillip Lawler

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, pages 8-11

Abstract: The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: 'representative', not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or 'ultraconservative', deciding to be fully transparent.

Keywords: Transparency; Optimal; delegation; Union; wage; determination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:8-11

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