Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

Cuihong Fan and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 98, issue 3, pages 327-334

Abstract: We consider procurement auctions when bid preparation is costly and shortlisting is adopted. We find that a policy of reimbursing bidding costs is profitable if and only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Negative rebates dominate positive rebates.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:327-334

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