Sustainable collusion on separate markets

Paul Belleflamme () and Francis Bloch ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, pages 384-386

Abstract: In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.

Date: 2008

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Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2006)
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