Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination

Lars Frisell and Johan N. M. Lagerlöf ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, pages 421-424

Abstract: A uniform pricing rule may enable the communication of demand information from buyer to seller in situations where this would not have been possible if the seller could price discriminate. Importantly, such a rule can benefit both buyer and seller.

Date: 2008

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