The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations

Ester Camiña and Nicolás Porteiro ()

European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 1, pages 73-92

Abstract: We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conflict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator who tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the final sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the player with a "weak" bargaining position in a conflict can strategically profit from the mediator's quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.

Keywords: Mediation; Rubinstein; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations (2007)
Working Paper: The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:1:p:73-92

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