Umbrella branding and external certification

Hendrik Hakenes () and Martin Peitz

European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, pages 186-196

Abstract: In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize equilibria in which umbrella branding fully or partially substitutes for external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection.

Keywords: Umbrella; branding; Certification; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64 ... 5e80e41cb868a4950f32
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Umbrella Branding and External Certification (2008)
Working Paper: Umbrella Branding and External Certification (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:186-196

Access Statistics for this article

European Economic Review is edited by G. A. Pfann, Z. Eckstein, E. Gal-Or, T. Gylfason and J. Von Hagen

More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().