Extreme screening policies
Arup Bose (),
Debashis Pal () and
European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 8, pages 1607-1620
We show that a lender often experiences increasing marginal returns to screening in a standard setting where the lender decides how intensively to screen the projects of prospective borrowers. The increasing marginal returns imply that even small changes in industry parameters can produce large changes in equilibrium screening intensity. In particular, a small reduction in the expected return from borrowers' projects can produce a pronounced increase in the screening of prospective borrowers, with substantial corresponding welfare effects.
Keywords: Screening; Adverse selection; Lending policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1607-1620
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