Sharing risk through concession contracts
Pasquale Scandizzo () and
Marco Ventura ()
European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 207, issue 1, pages 363-370
In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.
Keywords: Uncertainty; modelling; Real; option; Transportation; Risk; analysis; Concession; contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Sharing Risk Through Concession Contracts (2010)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:207:y:2010:i:1:p:363-370
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