EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2013
Edited by E. Kalai
from Elsevier
Access Statistics for this journal.
RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series .
Volume 80, issue C , 2013
An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games pp. 1-9 Sylvain Béal , Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal Reinforcement learning in population games pp. 10-38 Ratul Lahkar and Robert M. Seymour Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection pp. 39-67 Gabriel E. Kreindler and H. Peyton Young Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements pp. 68-84 Topi Miettinen On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws pp. 85-99 Özgür Kıbrıs and Arzu Kıbrıs A dynamic school choice model pp. 100-114 Juan Sebastián Pereyra Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication pp. 115-130 Jeffrey Carpenter , Michael Graham and Jesse Wolf Biased social learning pp. 131-146 Helios Herrera and Johannes Hörner The e-mail game phenomenon pp. 147-156 Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong Renegotiation-proof relational contracts pp. 157-178 Susanne Goldlücke and Sebastian Kranz The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models pp. 179-185 Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima Conservative belief and rationality pp. 186-192 Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass Competition for procurement shares pp. 193-208 José Alcalde and Matthias Dahm Harmful signaling in matching markets pp. 209-218 Alexey Kushnir Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points pp. 219-228 Peter Sudhölter and José M. Zarzuelo Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good pp. 229-242 Gergely Csapó and Rudolf Müller Pricing in social networks pp. 243-261 Francis Bloch and Nicolas Quérou Volume 79, issue C , 2013
Dynamics in tree formation games pp. 1-29 E. Arcaute , K. Dyagilev , R. Johari and S. Mannor Network design and defence pp. 30-43 Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities pp. 44-55 Stefan T. Trautmann and Richard J. Zeckhauser Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences pp. 56-66 Penélope Hernández , Manuel Muñoz-Herrera and Ángel Sánchez Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata pp. 67-74 Luciano Andreozzi Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence pp. 75-89 Ian M. McDonald , Nikos Nikiforakis , Nilss Olekalns and Hugh Sibly Auctions with entry and resale pp. 92-105 Xiaoshu Xu , Dan Levin and Lixin Ye Sources of variation in social networks pp. 106-131 Enghin Atalay The value of recommendations pp. 132-147 Jeanine Miklós-Thal and Heiner Schumacher Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching pp. 148-162 Javier Rivas Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach pp. 163-180 Valerio Capraro and Marco Scarsini Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information pp. 181-191 Andrew McGee and Huanxing Yang Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information pp. 192-200 Dov Samet Information sharing between vertical hierarchies pp. 201-222 Salvatore Piccolo and Marco Pagnozzi Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games pp. 223-232 C. Nicholas McKinney and John B. Van Huyck Volume 78, issue C , 2013
Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding pp. 1-20 Matthew Pearson and Burkhard Schipper The informational divide pp. 21-30 Manfred Nermuth , Giacomo Pasini , Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals pp. 31-43 Giacomo Bonanno How to win a large election pp. 44-63 Michael Mandler A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment pp. 64-71 Francoise Forges Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition pp. 72-84 Rene Saran and Norovsambuu Tumennasan Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality pp. 85-102 Patrick Hummel Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information pp. 103-120 Nicolas Jacquemet and Frederic Koessler Volume 77, issue 1 , 2013
Optimal allocation without transfer payments pp. 1-20 Surajeet Chakravarty and Todd R. Kaplan Admissibility and event-rationality pp. 21-40 Paulo Barelli and Spyros Galanis Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control pp. 41-60 Sandra Maximiano , Randolph Sloof and Joep Sonnemans Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle pp. 61-76 Changxia Ke , Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information pp. 77-89 Masaki Aoyagi Choice by sequential procedures pp. 90-99 Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Angel Ballester Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade pp. 100-121 Aviad Heifetz , Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations pp. 122-137 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria pp. 138-152 Norovsambuu Tumennasan The communication burden of payment determination pp. 153-167 Moshe Babaioff , Liad Blumrosen and Michael Schapira Minimax play by teams pp. 168-180 Yoshitaka Okano Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man? pp. 181-213 Yan Chen , Peter Katuščák and Emre Ozdenoren Bribing in first-price auctions pp. 214-228 Shiran Rachmilevitch The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks pp. 229-246 Gönül Doğan , Marcel van Assen and Jan Potters Auctions with a profit sharing contract pp. 247-270 Vineet Abhishek , Bruce Hajek and Steven R. Williams Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation pp. 271-283 Marco Faillo , Daniela Grieco and Luca Zarri Truth, justice, and cake cutting pp. 284-297 Yiling Chen , John K. Lai , David C. Parkes and Ariel D. Procaccia Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems pp. 298-320 Eugen Kovac and Jakub Steiner Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience pp. 321-344 Erte Xiao Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining pp. 345-351 Volker Britz Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining pp. 352-366 Juan Ortner Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions pp. 367-376 Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types pp. 377-404 Dawen Meng and Guoqiang Tian
EconPapers is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.