EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2013
Edited by E. Kalai
from Elsevier Series data maintained by Wendy Shamier ().
Access Statistics for this journal.
Track citations for all items by RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series .
Volume 80, issue C , 2013
An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games pp. 1-9
Sylvain Béal , Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
Reinforcement learning in population games pp. 10-38
Ratul Lahkar and Robert M. Seymour
Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection pp. 39-67
Gabriel E. Kreindler and H. Peyton Young
Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements pp. 68-84
Topi Miettinen
On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws pp. 85-99
Özgür Kıbrıs and Arzu Kıbrıs
A dynamic school choice model pp. 100-114
Juan Sebastián Pereyra
Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication pp. 115-130
Jeffrey Carpenter , Michael Graham and Jesse Wolf
Biased social learning pp. 131-146
Helios Herrera and Johannes Hörner
The e-mail game phenomenon pp. 147-156
Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts pp. 157-178
Susanne Goldlücke and Sebastian Kranz
The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models pp. 179-185
Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima
Conservative belief and rationality pp. 186-192
Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass
Competition for procurement shares pp. 193-208
José Alcalde and Matthias Dahm
Harmful signaling in matching markets pp. 209-218
Alexey Kushnir
Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points pp. 219-228
Peter Sudhölter and José M. Zarzuelo
Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good pp. 229-242
Gergely Csapó and Rudolf Müller
Pricing in social networks pp. 243-261
Francis Bloch and Nicolas Quérou
Volume 79, issue C , 2013
Dynamics in tree formation games pp. 1-29
E. Arcaute , K. Dyagilev , R. Johari and S. Mannor
Network design and defence pp. 30-43
Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal
Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities pp. 44-55
Stefan T. Trautmann and Richard J. Zeckhauser
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences pp. 56-66
Penélope Hernández , Manuel Muñoz-Herrera and Ángel Sánchez
Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata pp. 67-74
Luciano Andreozzi
Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence pp. 75-89
Ian M. McDonald , Nikos Nikiforakis , Nilss Olekalns and Hugh Sibly
Auctions with entry and resale pp. 92-105
Xiaoshu Xu , Dan Levin and Lixin Ye
Sources of variation in social networks pp. 106-131
Enghin Atalay
The value of recommendations pp. 132-147
Jeanine Miklós-Thal and Heiner Schumacher
Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching pp. 148-162
Javier Rivas
Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach pp. 163-180
Valerio Capraro and Marco Scarsini
Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information pp. 181-191
Andrew McGee and Huanxing Yang
Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information pp. 192-200
Dov Samet
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies pp. 201-222
Salvatore Piccolo and Marco Pagnozzi
Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games pp. 223-232
C. Nicholas McKinney and John B. Van Huyck
Volume 78, issue C , 2013
Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding pp. 1-20
Matthew Pearson and Burkhard Schipper
The informational divide pp. 21-30
Manfred Nermuth , Giacomo Pasini , Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer
A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals pp. 31-43
Giacomo Bonanno
How to win a large election pp. 44-63
Michael Mandler
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment pp. 64-71
Francoise Forges
Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition pp. 72-84
Rene Saran and Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality pp. 85-102
Patrick Hummel
Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information pp. 103-120
Nicolas Jacquemet and Frederic Koessler
Volume 77, issue 1 , 2013
Optimal allocation without transfer payments pp. 1-20
Surajeet Chakravarty and Todd R. Kaplan
Admissibility and event-rationality pp. 21-40
Paulo Barelli and Spyros Galanis
Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control pp. 41-60
Sandra Maximiano , Randolph Sloof and Joep Sonnemans
Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle pp. 61-76
Changxia Ke , Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath
Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information pp. 77-89
Masaki Aoyagi
Choice by sequential procedures pp. 90-99
Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Angel Ballester
Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade pp. 100-121
Aviad Heifetz , Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations pp. 122-137
Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl
To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria pp. 138-152
Norovsambuu Tumennasan
The communication burden of payment determination pp. 153-167
Moshe Babaioff , Liad Blumrosen and Michael Schapira
Minimax play by teams pp. 168-180
Yoshitaka Okano
Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man? pp. 181-213
Yan Chen , Peter Katuščák and Emre Ozdenoren
Bribing in first-price auctions pp. 214-228
Shiran Rachmilevitch
The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks pp. 229-246
Gönül Doğan , Marcel van Assen and Jan Potters
Auctions with a profit sharing contract pp. 247-270
Vineet Abhishek , Bruce Hajek and Steven R. Williams
Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation pp. 271-283
Marco Faillo , Daniela Grieco and Luca Zarri
Truth, justice, and cake cutting pp. 284-297
Yiling Chen , John K. Lai , David C. Parkes and Ariel D. Procaccia
Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems pp. 298-320
Eugen Kovac and Jakub Steiner
Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience pp. 321-344
Erte Xiao
Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining pp. 345-351
Volker Britz
Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining pp. 352-366
Juan Ortner
Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions pp. 367-376
Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun
Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types pp. 377-404
Dawen Meng and Guoqiang Tian