Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2013

Edited by E. Kalai

from Elsevier
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Volume 44, issue 2, 2003

Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining pp. 195-216

Dilip Abreu and Rajiv Sethi

The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games pp. 217-226

Michael R. Baye and Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer

Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring pp. 227-250

Elchanan Ben-Porath and Michael Kahneman

How noise matters pp. 251-271

Lawrence Edward Blume

The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly pp. 272-285

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz

Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts pp. 286-310

Kfir Eliaz

Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game pp. 311-331

Marina Nunez and Carles Rafels

Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences pp. 332-342

Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels

Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information pp. 343-378

William H. Sandholm

The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium pp. 379-389

Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Koji Takamiya

Strategic pattern recognition--experimental evidence pp. 390-411

Doron Sonsino and Julia Sirota

An implementation of the Owen value pp. 412-427

Juan Vidal-Puga and Gustavo Bergantinos

Volume 44, issue 1, 2003

Learning under limited information pp. 1-25

Yan Chen and Yuri Khoroshilov

Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation pp. 26-53

John Wilson Dickhaut, Margaret Ledyard, Arijit Mukherji and Haresh Sapra

Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations pp. 54-76

Thomas Kittsteiner

Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets pp. 77-97

Volker Nocke and Martin Peitz

Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness pp. 98-113

Francesco Squintani

Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra pp. 114-133

Balazs Szentes and Robert W. Rosenthal

'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game pp. 134-144

Roberto A. Weber

Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games pp. 145-171

Georg Weizsäcker

A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game pp. 172-182

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard pp. 183-194

Maria Paz Espinosa and Ines Macho-Stadler

Volume 43, issue 2, 2003

Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions pp. 175-188

Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky

Adaptive play with spatial sampling pp. 189-195

Jacques Durieu and Philippe Solal

Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities pp. 196-213

Chen-Ying Huang and Tomas Sjostrom

The effectiveness of English auctions pp. 214-238

Zvika Neeman

Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game pp. 239-265

Amnon Rapoport, William E. Stein, James E. Parco and Thomas E. Nicholas

Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information pp. 266-295

Paat Rusmevichientong and Benjamin Van Roy

Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages pp. 296-311

Andreas Westermark

Unraveling in first-price auction pp. 312-321

Parimal Bag

The museum pass game and its value pp. 322-325

Victor A. Ginsburgh and Israel Zang

Volume 43, issue 1, 2003

Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules pp. 1-27

Lars Ehlers

Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies pp. 28-43

Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz

Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing pp. 44-56

Sjur Didrik Flåm and A. Jourani

Networks of collaboration in oligopoly pp. 57-85

Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi

Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame pp. 86-106

Stefan Napel

On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games pp. 107-136

O'Connell, Thomas C. and Richard E. Stearns

Can you guess the game you are playing? pp. 137-152

Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper

Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances pp. 153-173

Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz

Volume 42, issue 2, 2003

Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates pp. 183-207

Rabah AMIR, Igor V. Evstigneev and John Wooders

Admissibility and common belief pp. 208-234

Geir B. Asheim and Martin Dufwenberg

Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning pp. 235-252

Vincent Buskens

A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy pp. 253-266

Alok Kumar and Martin Shubik

Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome pp. 267-280

Kali P. Rath and Gongyun Zhao

Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play pp. 281-299

David Russell Schmidt, Robert Shupp, James Marvin Walker and Elinor Ostrom

An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games pp. 300-306

Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Strong comparative statics of equilibria pp. 307-314

Federico Echenique and Tarun Sabarwal

A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem pp. 315-318

Wojciech Olszewski

Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain pp. 319-326

Asher Wolinsky

The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp pp. 327-332

Philip J. Reny

Volume 42, issue 1, 2003

Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments pp. 1-24

Pradeep Dubey and Ori Haimanko

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information pp. 25-47

Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille

Hiding information in electoral competition pp. 48-74

Paul Heidhues and Johan N. M. Lagerlof

The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations pp. 75-90

Drora Karotkin and Mary Schaps

Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model pp. 91-100

Flip Klijn and Jordi Masso

A wide range no-regret theorem pp. 101-115

Ehud Lehrer

Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning pp. 116-136

Antonio Merlo and Andrew Schotter

The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games pp. 137-155

Massimo Morelli and Maria Montero

Cost allocation in spanning network enterprises with stochastic connection costs pp. 156-171

Jeroen Suijs

Risk taking in selection contests pp. 172-179

Hans K. Hvide and Eirik G. Kristiansen