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Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2013
Edited by E. Kalai
from Elsevier
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Volume 49, issue 2 , 2004
On coalitional semivalues pp. 221-243 M. Josune Albizuri and José Manuel Zarzuelo Stochastic imitation in finite games pp. 244-259 Jens Josephson and Alexander Matros Best response equivalence pp. 260-287 Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui A model of the origins of basic property rights pp. 288-312 Abhinay Muthoo Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 313-344 Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala Efficient spatial competition pp. 345-362 Harborne W. Stuart Program equilibrium pp. 363-373 Moshe Tennenholtz The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs pp. 374-400 Felix Vardy An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs pp. 401-423 John Morgan and Felix Vardy Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation pp. 424-434 Pablo Amoros Volume 49, issue 1 , 2004
NP-completeness in hedonic games pp. 1-30 Coralio Ballester A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index pp. 31-48 Rana Barua , Satya R. Chakravarty , Sonali Roy and Palash Sarkar Dynamic interactive epistemology pp. 49-80 Oliver James Board Non-excludable public good experiments pp. 81-102 Timothy Cason , Tatsuyoshi Saijo , Takehiko Yamato and Konomu Yokotani Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems pp. 103-116 Lars Ehlers , Hans J.M. Peters and Ton Storcken The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining pp. 117-134 Aviad Heifetz and Ella Segev Rationalizability for social environments pp. 135-156 P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule pp. 157-170 Özgür Kıbrıs Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations pp. 171-214 Mark Stegeman and Paul W. Rhode Reviews and Comments pp. 215-219 Benny Moldovanu Volume 48, issue 2 , 2004
Stochastic stability in a double auction pp. 203-222 Murali Agastya Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games pp. 223-248 Bhaskar Dutta and Anirban Kar In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm pp. 249-270 Lars Ehlers Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs pp. 271-291 Roland Hain and Manipushpak Mitra Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games pp. 292-320 Frederic Koessler Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information pp. 321-336 Christoph Kuzmics Unique stability in simple coalition formation games pp. 337-354 Szilvia Papai Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views pp. 355-384 Philip J. Reny and Arthur John Robson On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response pp. 385-402 Makoto Shimoji Preparation pp. 403-414 Mark Voorneveld Volume 48, issue 1 , 2004
Restabilizing matching markets at senior level pp. 1-17 David Cantala Random paths to stability in the roommate problem pp. 18-28 Effrosyni Diamantoudi , Eiichi Miyagawa and Licun Xue Successful uninformed bidding pp. 29-53 Angel Hernando-Veciana An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations pp. 54-85 Oliver Kirchkamp and Benny Moldovanu The coalition structure core is accessible pp. 86-93 László Á. Kóczy and Luc Lauwers Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation pp. 94-110 Nikolai S. Kukushkin Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments pp. 111-123 Suresh Mutuswami , David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents pp. 124-138 David Peter Myatt and Chris Wallace Bargaining with an agenda pp. 139-153 O'Neill, Barry , Dov Samet , Zvi Wiener and Eyal Winter Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies pp. 154-170 James Schummer Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games pp. 171-200 Marco Slikker and Henk Norde Volume 47, issue 2 , 2004
Memory and perfect recall in extensive games pp. 237-256 Giacomo Bonanno On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games pp. 257-267 Youngsub Chun A theory of sequential reciprocity pp. 268-298 Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger Bribing and signaling in second price auctions pp. 299-324 Peter Eso and James Schummer An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow pp. 325-352 Eric Friedman , Mikhael Shor , Scott Shenker and Barry Sopher Random-player games pp. 353-388 Igal Milchtaich Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games pp. 389-403 Tim Roughgarden and Eva Tardos Endogenous price leadership pp. 404-420 Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity pp. 421-452 Andreas Westermark Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259] pp. 453-453 Andreas Blume and Tone Arnold Volume 47, issue 1 , 2004
Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies pp. 1-35 Nabil . Al-Najjar Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing pp. 36-71 Aaron Archer , Joan Feigenbaum , Arvind Krishnamurthy , Rahul Sami and Scott Shenker Observational learning under imperfect information pp. 72-86 Bogaçhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions pp. 87-103 Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions pp. 104-123 Ron Holzman , Noa Kfir-Dahav , Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals pp. 124-156 Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala Belief-based equilibrium pp. 157-171 Alvaro Sandroni and Rann Smorodinsky Games with espionage pp. 172-199 Eilon Solan and Leeat Yariv Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game pp. 200-220 Ran Spiegler Individually rational pure strategies in large games pp. 221-233 William George Stanford
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