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Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2013
Edited by E. Kalai
from Elsevier
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Volume 55, issue 2 , 2006
Mini special issue: Electronic Market Design pp. 213-214 Eric van Damme , Rudolf Müller and Rakesh V. Vohra Ascending price Vickrey auctions pp. 215-241 Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy Competitive auctions pp. 242-269 Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin , Michael Saks and Andrew Wright Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities pp. 270-296 Benny Lehmann , Daniel Lehmann and Noam Nisan Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction pp. 297-320 Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets pp. 321-330 Tuomas Sandholm and Subhash Suri Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power pp. 331-339 Jean-Pierre Benoit and Efe A. Ok A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information pp. 340-371 Juin-Kuan Chong , Colin F. Camerer and Teck Hua Ho Efficient priority rules pp. 372-384 Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations--The anonymous case pp. 385-406 Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz Volume 55, issue 1 , 2006
Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly pp. 1-20 Rabah AMIR and Anna Stepanova The evolution of focal points pp. 21-42 Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty pp. 43-71 Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Lambros Pechlivanos Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices pp. 72-99 Katsushige Fujimoto , Ivan Kojadinovic and Jean-Luc Marichal Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem pp. 100-111 Julio Gonzalez-Diaz Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution pp. 112-130 Daniel Andres Hojman and Adam Szeidl Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions pp. 131-151 Bernard Lebrun Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing pp. 152-188 Herve Moulin and Yves Sprumont Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information pp. 189-206 Charles Noussair and Jonathon Silver Volume 54, issue 2 , 2006
Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity pp. 241-260 Christopher P. Chambers Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games pp. 261-292 Martin Dindos and Claudio Mezzetti A theory of reciprocity pp. 293-315 Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher Dynamic yardstick mechanisms pp. 316-335 A. Faure-Grimaud and S. Reiche Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games pp. 336-352 Douglas Gale and Hamid Sabourian Network formation with heterogeneous players pp. 353-372 Andrea Galeotti , Sanjeev Goyal and Jurjen Johannes Antonie Kamphorst The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games pp. 373-379 Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games pp. 380-397 Maria Montero Allocation problems among sharing groups pp. 398-418 Sangkyu Rhee A note on a value with incomplete communication pp. 419-429 J.M. Bilbao , N. Jimenez and J.J. Lopez Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto pp. 430-440 Christopher P. Chambers and Takashi Hayashi Volume 54, issue 1 , 2006
Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism pp. 1-24 Christopher M. Anderson and Louis Putterman The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note pp. 25-30 Anindya Bhattacharya and Abderrahmane Ziad Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry pp. 31-46 Indranil Chakraborty Approval voting with endogenous candidates pp. 47-76 Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oak Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games pp. 77-94 Pradeep Dubey , Ori Haimanko and Andriy Zapechelnyuk Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games pp. 95-114 Jim Engle-Warnick and Robert L Slonim Parametric rationing methods pp. 115-133 Marek M. Kaminski An experimental study of price dispersion pp. 134-158 John Morgan , Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining pp. 159-182 Charles H. Mullin and David H. Reiley Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets pp. 183-204 Tibor Neugebauer and Reinhard Selten The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks pp. 205-225 Jos Potters , Hans Reijnierse and Amit Biswas The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies pp. 226-240 Abraham L. Wickelgren Volume 53, issue 2 , 2005
Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games pp. 151-169 Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions pp. 170-207 John H. Kagel and Dan Levin A folk theorem for minority games pp. 208-230 Jérôme Renault , Sergio Scarlatti and Marco Scarsini Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information pp. 231-247 Satoru Takahashi Axiomatization of the core of assignment games pp. 248-261 Manabu Toda Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory pp. 262-268 Eduardo Zambrano B. Peleg and P. Sudholter, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Kluwer Academic, Boston (2003) ISBN 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages pp. 269-270 Michael Maschler Volume 53, issue 1 , 2005
Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly pp. 1-14 Rabah AMIR Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games pp. 15-42 Geir B. Asheim and Andres Perea y Monsuwe Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem pp. 43-58 Parimal Bag and Hamid Sabourian Finite memory and imperfect monitoring pp. 59-72 Harold Linh Cole and Narayana Kocherlakota Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example pp. 73-82 Geoffroy de Clippel Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory pp. 83-109 Jeffrey C. Ely and William H. Sandholm Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning pp. 110-125 Ed Hopkins and Martin Posch Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria pp. 126-140 George J. Mailath , Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson Fee versus royalty reconsidered pp. 141-147 Debapriya Sen
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