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Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2013
Edited by E. Kalai
from Elsevier
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Volume 63, issue 2 , 2008
Presidential address pp. 421-430 Ehud Kalai 2004 World Congress Special Issue pp. 431-434 Philip J. Reny Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate pp. 435-467 Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov Efficient communication in the electronic mail game pp. 468-497 Kris De Jaegher When is reputation bad? pp. 498-526 Jeffrey C. Ely , Drew Fudenberg and David Knudsen Levine Ex post implementation pp. 527-566 Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness pp. 567-587 Herve Moulin Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles pp. 588-620 Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen New complexity results about Nash equilibria pp. 621-641 Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium pp. 642-662 Ryan Porter , Eugene Nudelman and Yoav Shoham Sequential decisions with tests pp. 663-678 David Gill and Daniel Sgroi The value of a stochastic information structure pp. 679-693 Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer Volume 63, issue 1 , 2008
24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs pp. 1-31 Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts Proper scoring rules for general decision models pp. 32-40 Christopher P. Chambers Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies pp. 41-55 Tarek Coury and Vladimir Petkov Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories pp. 56-76 David Lewis Dickinson and Marie Claire Villeval Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs pp. 77-90 Michael A. Fishman License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers pp. 91-106 Thomas Giebe and Elmar Wolfstetter Case-based learning with different similarity functions pp. 107-132 Ani Guerdjikova A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems pp. 133-144 Chih Chang and Cheng-Cheng Hu Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions pp. 145-165 Rene Kirkegaard and Per Baltzer Overgaard Adaptation and complexity in repeated games pp. 166-187 Eliot Maenner Group identification pp. 188-202 Alan D. Miller Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system pp. 203-226 Christina Pawlowitsch Regret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable stage duration pp. 227-258 Shie Mannor and Nahum Shimkin Fictitious play in 3x3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour pp. 259-291 Colin Sparrow , Sebastian van Strien and Christopher Harris Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees pp. 292-307 Dale O. Stahl and Ernan Haruvy Coordination cycles pp. 308-327 Jakub Steiner The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses pp. 328-340 Satoru Takahashi Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index pp. 341-353 Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano Long-run selection and the work ethic pp. 354-365 Jens Josephson and Karl Wärneryd Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample pp. 366-369 Philipp C. Wichardt Evaluating generalizability and parameter consistency in learning models pp. 370-394 Eldad Yechiam and Jerome R. Busemeyer Epistemic conditions for rationalizability pp. 395-405 Eduardo Zambrano Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals pp. 406-416 Bingyong Zheng H. Peyton Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford Univ. Press (2004) 165 pages pp. 417-420 William H. Sandholm Volume 62, issue 2 , 2008
Multiperson utility pp. 329-347 Manel Baucells and Lloyd S. Shapley Consistent representative democracy pp. 348-363 Christopher P. Chambers Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation pp. 364-382 Giovanna Maria Devetag and Massimo Warglien Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions pp. 383-416 Kfir Eliaz , Theo Offerman and Andrew Schotter Bargaining, search, and outside options pp. 417-435 Anita Gantner Information acquisition in committees pp. 436-459 Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv Stable governments and the semistrict core pp. 460-475 Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders pp. 476-508 Ronald M. Harstad , Aleksandar Sasa Pekec and Ilia Tsetlin When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation pp. 509-532 Daniel Houser , Erte Xiao , Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations pp. 533-557 Philippe Jehiel and Frederic Koessler Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case pp. 558-572 Justin T. Leroux Diffusion in complex social networks pp. 573-590 Dunia López-Pintado Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions pp. 591-609 Claudio Mezzetti , Aleksandar Sasa Pekec and Ilia Tsetlin Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces pp. 610-627 Thomas W. L. Norman Lexicographic composition of simple games pp. 628-642 O'Neill, Barry and Bezalel Peleg A game of timing and visibility pp. 643-660 Zvi Lotker , Boaz Patt-Shamir and Mark R. Tuttle A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit pp. 661-674 Abhijit Sengupta and Kunal Sengupta Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives pp. 675-696 Fei Song Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis pp. 697-721 John H. Kagel , Svetlana Pevnitskaya and Lixin Ye Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions pp. 722-731 Lucie Ménager Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games pp. 732-735 Marcin Peski Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology pp. 736-738 Bernard Monjardet Volume 62, issue 1 , 2008
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions pp. 1-25 Estelle Cantillon Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms pp. 26-52 Herbert Dawid and W. Bentley Macleod Universal knowledge-belief structures pp. 53-66 Martin Meier An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma pp. 67-76 David Peter Myatt and Chris Wallace The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games pp. 77-92 P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Gerard van der Laan and Dolf Talman The two-person beauty contest pp. 93-99 Brit Grosskopf and Rosemarie Chariklia Nagel Cores of convex and strictly convex games pp. 100-105 Julio Gonzalez-Diaz and Estela Sanchez-Rodriguez Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency pp. 106-115 Emre Ozdenoren and James Peck Core stability in chain-component additive games pp. 116-139 Bas van Velzen , Herbert Hamers and Tamás Solymosi Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint pp. 140-154 Helmuts Azacis Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty pp. 155-179 Theodore L. Turocy Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games pp. 180-189 Miltiadis Makris Reputation and impermanent types pp. 190-210 Thomas Wiseman Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes pp. 211-231 Lucy White Interactive unawareness revisited pp. 232-262 Joseph Halpern and Leandro Chaves Rego The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information pp. 263-286 Uri Simonsohn , Niklas Karlsson , George Loewenstein and Dan Ariely Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter pp. 287-303 Armin Falk , Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher A canonical model for interactive unawareness pp. 304-324 Aviad Heifetz , Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper Expanded number of Editors at Games and Economic Behavior pp. 324-326 Ehud Kalai Erratum to "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions" [Games Econ. Behav. 61 (2007) 179-197] pp. 324-325 Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer
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