Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2012

Edited by E. Kalai

from Elsevier
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Volume 68, issue 2, 2010

The logit-response dynamics pp. 413-427

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer

Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages pp. 428-442

Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Zaifu Yang

Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives pp. 443-468

Joyce E. Berg, John Wilson Dickhaut and Thomas A. Rietz

Peace agreements without commitment pp. 469-487

Carmen Bevia and Luis C. Corchon

Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study pp. 488-511

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy

On effectivity functions of game forms pp. 512-531

Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich and Kazuhisa Makino

Clock games: Theory and experiments pp. 532-550

Markus K. Brunnermeier and John Morgan

On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda pp. 551-556

Gary Charness, Edi Karni and Dan Levin

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA pp. 557-579

Yan Chen and Kan Takeuchi

Sharing information in Web communities pp. 580-601

Gabrielle Demange

Partial exposure in large games pp. 602-613

Ronen Gradwohl and Omer Reingold

Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior pp. 614-625

Emily C. Haisley and Roberto A. Weber

The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure pp. 626-633

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, Dolf Talman and Z. Yang

Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field pp. 634-645

Andreas Lange and Anmol Ratan

Optimal collusion with internal contracting pp. 646-669

Gea M. Lee

Signaling and mediation in games with common interests pp. 670-682

Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya

Simple complexity from imitation games pp. 683-688

Andrew McLennan and Rabee Tourky

Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments pp. 689-702

Nikos Nikiforakis

Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents pp. 703-715

Sérgio O. Parreiras and Anna Rubinchik

Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback pp. 716-730

Scott Rick and Roberto A. Weber

Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests pp. 731-747

Roman M. Sheremeta

Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information pp. 748-762

Artyom Shneyerov and Chi Leung Wong

On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle pp. 763-772

Juan Carlos Carbajal

Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching pp. 773-780

Scott Duke Kominers

The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships pp. 781-788

Imran Rasul and Silvia Sonderegger

Games and science pp. 789-792

Aviad Heifetz

Volume 68, issue 1, 2010

A sequential selection game with vetoes pp. 1-14

Steve Alpern, Shmuel Gal and Eilon Solan

Simple games with many effective voters pp. 15-22

Eyal Beigman

Pre-match investment with frictions pp. 23-34

Chris Bidner

Secure implementation in allotment economies pp. 35-49

Olivier Bochet and Toyotaka Sakai

Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance? pp. 50-59

Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie

Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence pp. 60-76

Damian S. Damianov, Jörg Oechssler and Johannes Gerd Becker

On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium pp. 77-94

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz

Testing guilt aversion pp. 95-107

Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Sigve Tjøtta and Gaute Torsvik

When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? pp. 108-129

Amanda Friedenberg

Perception of probabilities in situations of risk: A case based approach pp. 130-143

Gabrielle Gayer

Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information pp. 144-154

Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu

Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability pp. 155-179

Joseph Halpern

Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust pp. 180-191

Florian Herold

Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly pp. 192-207

Maarten Janssen and Santanu Roy

Risk aversion and expected utility of consumption over time pp. 208-219

Olof Johansson-Stenman

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems pp. 220-232

Cagatay Kayi and Eve Ramaekers

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules pp. 233-241

Özgür Kıbrıs and Ipek Gürsel TapkI

Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies pp. 242-254

Chongmin Kim and Kam-Chau Wong

Moral norms in a partly compliant society pp. 255-274

Sebastian Kranz

Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach pp. 275-302

Francois Paul Maniquet and Yves Sprumont

Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment pp. 303-324

Michal Ramsza and Robert M. Seymour

Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context pp. 325-338

Julian Rode

Attribution and reciprocity pp. 339-352

Alexander Sebald

Public information and electoral bias pp. 353-375

Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim

On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard pp. 376-380

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser and Uday Rajan

Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games pp. 381-388

Guilherme Carmona

Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure pp. 389-402

Yi-Chun Chen

The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets pp. 403-410

Mark Voorneveld

Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA pp. 411-411

Moshe Dror and Greys Sosic