Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 62, issue 2, pages 610-627

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces (2005)
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