A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Chih Chang and Hu, Cheng-Cheng

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 133-144

Abstract: First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided.

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