The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses

Satoru Takahashi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 328-340

Abstract: We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria becomes much larger than the unconditional expected number as the size of the game grows.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedi ... 45e8a3ab7dc0b1140ecb
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().