Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 341-353

Abstract: In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We show how the Shapley-Shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of [`]bargaining power' that appear in this light as limit cases.

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