Long-run selection and the work ethic

Jens Josephson and Karl Wärneryd

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 354-365

Abstract: That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic (2004)
Working Paper: Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic (2004)
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