Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals

Bingyong Zheng

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 406-416

Abstract: This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obtain an approximate efficiency result.

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