Ex post implementation

Dirk Bergemann () and Stephen Morris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 2, pages 527-566

Abstract: We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and--in economic environments--sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by Maskin monotonicity. The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. We further describe a Pareto correspondence that fails ex post monotonicity but satisfies Maskin monotonicity.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ex Post Implementation (2006)
Working Paper: Ex Post Implementation (2005)
Working Paper: Ex Post Implementation (2005)
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