Majority rule when voters like to win

Steven Callander ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, pages 393-420

Abstract: I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate and to vote for the winner. When voters care only about the winning candidate (the standard formulation) a unique responsive equilibrium exists. The addition of a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some with unusual properties. In most of these equilibria information is not aggregated effectively, and I uncover the novel possibility of negative information aggregation in which information aggregated in equilibrium is used to select the worse rather than the better candidate. I then characterize the efficiency of optimal equilibria as the population becomes large and show that a discontinuity arises in the information aggregation capabilities of the majority rule voting mechanism: in elections without a dominant front-running candidate the better candidate is almost surely elected, whereas in races with a front-runner information cannot be effectively aggregated in equilibrium.

Keywords: Strategic; voting; Information; aggregation; Conformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:393-420

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