Repeated signaling games

Ayça Kaya

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, pages 841-854

Abstract: I analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions is perfectly observable. In this context, a large class of possibly complex sequences of signals can be supported as the separating equilibrium actions of the "strong type" of the informed player. I characterize the set of such sequences. I also characterize the sequences of signals in least cost separating equilibria (LCSE) of these games. In doing this, I introduce a state variable that can be interpreted as a measure of reputation. This gives the optimization problem characterizing the LCSE a recursive structure. I show that, in general, the equilibrium path sequences of signals have a simple structure. The shapes of the optimal sequences depend critically on the relative concavities of the payoff functions of different types, which measure the relative preferences towards payoff smoothing.

Keywords: Signaling; games; Dynamic; games; Repeated; games; Asymmetric; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:841-854

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