Rapid evolution under inertia

Thomas W. L. Norman

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, pages 865-879

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes mxm pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 17-45] "step-by-step" evolution to occur.

Keywords: Evolution; Mutations; Long-run; equilibrium; Waiting; times; Inertia; Switching; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rapid Evolution under Inertia (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:865-879

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