A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions

Selcuk Ozyurt () and M. Remzi Sanver ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, pages 880-892

Abstract: A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D[lambda] of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D[lambda]. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D[lambda] while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Manipulation; Gibbard-Satterthwaite; theorem; Social; choice; correspondences; Hyperfunctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:880-892

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