Approachability with bounded memory

Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, pages 995-1004

Abstract: We study Blackwell's approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs when the approaching player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory: either strategies with bounded recall, or strategies that can be implemented by finite automata. Our main finding is that the following three statements are equivalent for closed sets. (i) The set is approachable with bounded recall strategies. (ii) The set is approachable with strategies that can be implemented with finite automata. (iii) The set contains a convex approachable set. Using our results we show that (i) there are almost-regret-free strategies with bounded memory, (ii) there is a strategy with bounded memory to choose the best among several experts, and (iii) Hart and Mas-Colell's adaptive learning procedure can be achieved using strategies with bounded memory.

Keywords: Approachability; Repeated; games; Vector; payoffs; Bounded; memory; Bounded; recall; Automata; No-regret; Adaptive; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:995-1004

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