Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov and Moshe Tennenholtz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 67, issue 1, pages 156-173

Abstract: We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.

Keywords: Congestion; games; Load-dependent; resource; failures; Pure; strategy; Nash; equilibrium; Algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:156-173

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