Manipulation via capacities revisited

Lars Ehlers

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, pages 302-311

Abstract: This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is non-manipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.

Keywords: Two-sided; matching; Stability; Manipulation; Capacities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Manipulation via Capacities Revisited (2009)
Working Paper: Manipulation via Capacities Revisited (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:302-311

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