Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods

Uwe Dulleck () and Rudolf Kerschbamer

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 27, issue 1, pages 15-23

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers-cheating experts problem.

Keywords: Experts; Discounters; Credence; goods; Free-riding; consumers; Free; diagnosis; Contingent; diagnostic; fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods (2007)
Working Paper: Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:1:p:15-23

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