On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games

Theo S.H. Driessen, Vito Fragnelli (), Ilya Katsev () and Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2011, vol. 48, issue 2, pages 217-225

Abstract: The insurance situation in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we present certain conditions on the parameters of the model that guarantee the 1-convexity property of co-insurance games which in turn ensures the nonemptiness of the core and the linearity of the nucleolus as a function of the variable premium. Further we reveal conditions when a co-insurance game is representable in the form of a veto-removed game and present an efficient final algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a veto-removed game.

Keywords: Insurance; situation; Cooperative; game; Core; Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:insuma:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:217-225

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