Shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior

Jonathan L. Rogers and Andrew Van Buskirk

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2009, vol. 47, issue 1-2, pages 136-156

Abstract: We examine changes in the disclosure behavior of firms involved in 827 disclosure-related class-action securities litigation cases filed between 1996 and 2005. We find no evidence that the firms in our sample respond to the litigation event by increasing or improving their disclosures to investors. Rather, we find consistent evidence that firms reduce the level of information provided post-litigation. Our results suggest that the litigation process encourages firms to decrease the provision of disclosures for which they may later be held accountable, despite the increased protections afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Keywords: Litigation; risk; Conference; calls; Management; forecasts; Earnings; surprises; Forecast; properties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V87 ... 95395eb712983975f827
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:47:y:2009:i:1-2:p:136-156

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Accounting and Economics is edited by J. L. Zimmerman, S. P. Kothari, T. Z. Lys and R. L. Watts

More articles in Journal of Accounting and Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().