Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Tong Lu and K. Sivaramakrishnan

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2009, vol. 28, issue 2, pages 71-91

Abstract: Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies' investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors' independence and companies' opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms' incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.

Keywords: Auditor; independence; Auditor; conservatism; Audit; quality; Investment; efficiency; Auditor; rotation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jappol:v:28:y:2009:i:2:p:71-91

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