Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly

Changying Li and Juan Song

Japan and the World Economy, 2009, vol. 21, issue 2, pages 183-190

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a vertically differentiated duopoly model where a high-quality producer competes against a low-quality producer, a la Cournot competition. The high-quality firm has both a new technology and an obsolescent technology. After first deciding whether to license, the firm then chooses which of the two technologies to license. We show that, irrespective of the licensing contract, licensing the new technology is always superior to licensing the obsolescent technology. This finding poses a sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.

Keywords: Licensing; New; technology; Obsolescent; technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VF1 ... b97fe8926ec63eb59702
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:japwor:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:183-190

Access Statistics for this article

Japan and the World Economy is edited by Robert Dekle and Yasushi Hamao

More articles in Japan and the World Economy from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().