Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance

Jerry Sun, Steven F. Cahan and David Emanuel

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, vol. 33, issue 8, pages 1507-1519

Abstract: This paper examines whether the relationship between future firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) stock option grants is affected by the quality of the compensation committee. Compensation committee quality is measured using six committee characteristics - the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, the proportion of directors with at least ten years' board service, the proportion of directors who are CEOs at other companies, the aggregate shareholding of directors on the compensation committee, the proportion of directors with three or more additional board seats, and compensation committee size. We find that future firm performance is more positively associated with stock option grants as compensation committee quality increases.

Keywords: CEO; compensation; Compensation; committees; Stock; option; grants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:8:p:1507-1519

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