Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions
Santiago Moreno-Bromberg and
Quynh-Anh Vo ()
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2017, vol. 82, issue C, 40-58
We introduce, in a dynamic-contracting framework with moral hazard, the possibility of recapitalization as an alternative to liquidation when a firm is distressed. This is achieved by considering a risk-averse agent and by allowing (but not requiring) the latter to inject additional capital into the firm when necessary. We show that firm recapitalization may arise in an optimal, long-term contract. As a consequence, we find that there are two mechanisms at a firm’s disposal so as to deal with financial difficulties: one corresponds to a recapitalization process, the other to a liquidation one. The choice of mechanism is based on a cost-benefit analysis.
Keywords: Dynamic financial contracting; Moral hazard; Recapitalization; Liquidation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G32 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:40-58
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().